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HOW UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF 
CORPORATE NORMS CAN PREVENT THEIR 
DESTRUCTION BY SETTLEMENTS 
JAMES D. COX† 
ABSTRACT 
  Scholars have long celebrated the importance of norms in corporate 
law. Indeed, norms likely guide corporate actors more than the 
omnipresent threat of shareholder suits. This Article divides corporate 
norms into two distinct groups: aspirational norms and arbiter norms. 
Aspirational norms announce socially desirable objectives for 
corporate managers and encourage certain disclosure practices; arbiter 
norms identify distinct transactions for closer scrutiny by an 
independent body, the court. This Article shows that even though 
aspirational norms and arbiter norms serve different objectives, they 
share a common characteristic—overbreadth. This feature exists 
whether the norm is set forth by statute or found in judicial doctrine. 
Such overbreadth explains some, but by no means all, of the problems 
accompanying shareholder litigation, including the frequency of suits 
and inconsequential settlements. This Article also develops the 
paradoxes that accompany corporate norms. 
  The inherent overbreadth of both aspirational and arbiter norms 
can be of great assistance to their protection against inconsequential 
settlements. Using the recent decision In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder 
Litigation, this Article addresses how courts can fulfill their role in the 
non-adversarial setting of the settlement hearing. When asked to 
approve a settlement, the court should anchor its scrutiny of the 
adequacy and reasonableness of a settlement in the norm that is central 
to the suit. By doing so, the court can more positively contribute to the 
ongoing development of corporate norms. 
INTRODUCTION 
We are now in the fifth decade of lamenting our litigious society; 
critics claim we are in the grips of a self-interested legal profession that 
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feeds itself on the rising tide of litigation, profiting lavishly by both the 
prosecution and defense of baseless suits.1 Even though this is a 
proposition that is hotly debated, a variety of legal reforms have 
nonetheless been founded on the idea that there are too many suits 
brought in every imaginable arena.2 
Beginning in 1973, judges and academics raised attention—
indeed, alarm—regarding the litigiousness of American society based 
on the perceived explosion of civil litigation that was burying the 
courts.3 For the next fifty years there was concern that the demand for 
justice was growing at a faster pace than society’s willingness to provide 
resources to meet the rising demand. There are multiple causes of the 
increase in suits, including the explosion of rights created by courts and 
legislatures; the concomitant rise in expectations fed by law reform 
efforts throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; the growing attention 
that the media has accorded the law; the explosive growth in the 
number of lawyers (and their newly recognized freedom to advertise); 
and the ability to vindicate mass torts such as asbestos and intrauterine-
device claims.4 Court backlogs grew visibly, as did the cries that too 
 
 1. For an early claim of excessive civil litigation, see Maurice Rosenberg, Let’s Everybody 
Litigate?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1349–51 (1972). Even a former vice president boldly embraced 
the view of the country being overtaken by an avalanche of litigation. See Dan Quayle, Civil 
Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 560 (1992) (“Few would dispute the proposition that 
America has become a litigious society . . . .”). For a critical analysis of the data on which the 
litigiousness claims are based, see WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE 
LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 73–109 (2004); see also Marc Galanter, 
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) 
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 69–71 (1983) 
(combatting the “litigation explosion” theory and instead arguing that the rise in litigation is “an 
adaptive (but not necessarily optimal) response to a set of changing conditions”). 
 2. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, §§ 2, 4, 119 Stat. 4, 4–5, 10 
(amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1339(d), 1453, 1711–15) (granting federal courts jurisdiction over 
class action suits in which at least one hundred plaintiffs seek damages in excess of $5 million, and 
calling for closer review of settlements, as part of a tort reform effort sparked by concerns about 
abuses within the state judicial system); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. 
L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (authorizing 
the removal of class actions to federal court in certain securities contexts, so as to prevent 
plaintiffs from avoiding the restrictions introduced by the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 
737–43 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.) (adding provisions directed to the prosecution of 
securities fraud claims). 
 3. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 20–23 (1973) 
(discussing a range of social, legislative, and judicial developments contributing to a significant 
increase in cases before the federal courts); John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 567, 567 (1975) (discussing the recent “legal explosion” and growth in caseloads).  
 4. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Litigation Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
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many complaints found their way into the courts. Leading 
commentators, such as Professors Arthur Miller and Marc Galanter, 
have produced substantial scholarship and supporting data 
demonstrating that the litigation explosion is more myth than reality.5 
Nonetheless, the image of a litigation explosion continues today. 
Corporate law is very much a part of, if not now central to, the 
litigation-explosion debate. Congress addressed a rather narrow corner 
of the litigation spectrum—securities fraud suits, particularly those 
maintained as class actions—with the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).6 The hearings leading up to the passage 
of the PSLRA,7 and the committee report accompanying the final 
version of the legislation,8 are replete with calls to winnow the number 
of securities fraud suits. Unlike other areas in which congressional 
action produced few observable impacts, the PSLRA changed the 
landscape dramatically. For example, in just a few years following the 
passage of the PSLRA, the rate at which defendants prevailed on 
motions to dismiss in securities class actions nearly doubled.9 
 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 989–92 (2003) (identifying these and other reasons for the 
salience the litigation-explosion charge enjoys). 
 5. Professor Miller observes that despite the U.S. litigation rate increasing since the 1950s, 
the rate is “not higher than it has been during other periods of American history, and, per capita, 
is in the same range as other industrialized countries’ rates.” Id. at 993–94 (footnote omitted). 
Professor Galanter observes that growth in case filings can be the result of unique developments; 
for example, he reports that 75 percent of the cases between 1975 and 1985 were explained by five 
categories that included prisoner petitions, social security, and civil rights cases. Marc Galanter, 
The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 17 (1986). His point is that the clustering 
of cases occurs over time and reflects not a societal predisposition to litigation, but rather the 
“ebb-and-flow” societal forces and developments that produce injuries and claims for redress. Id. 
at 28. For example, more than a quarter of the tort filings (one of the five categories he identified 
as driving most of the increase in filings) were prompted by the publicity of the harms of asbestos 
and the approaching expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. at 24. 
 6. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 7. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Telecomm. 
and Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. at 18 (1994) (statement of Hon. 
Ralph Hall); Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Secs. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. at 2 (1993) 
(statement of Sen. Chris Dodd); STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON SECS. OF THE COMM. ON BANKING, 
HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, 103D CONG., REP. ON PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION (May 17, 
1994). 
 8. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing the inclusion of 
numerous sections intended for the “reduction of abusive litigation”). 
 9. Compare RONALD I. MILLER, TODD FOSTER & ELAINE BUCKBERG, NERA ECON. 
CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: BEYOND THE 
MEGA-SETTLEMENTS, IS STABILIZATION AHEAD? 4 (2006), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/
nera/publications/archive1/BRO_RecentTrends2006_SEC979_PPB-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.
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But not all efforts to reduce the frequency of corporate litigation 
are legislative. The Supreme Court has weighed in mightily to reduce 
the scope of the fraud provisions of the Securities Act10 and the 
Securities Exchange Act,11 and has justified the resulting standard as a 
means of reducing the frequency of litigation. 
Most recently, the litigation-explosion debate has centered on 
state-based litigation in connection with mergers and acquisitions 
transactions.12 Most noticeable in this area are the dramatic changes in 
corporate deal litigation. Consider that from 1999 to 2000 only 12 
percent of deals involved litigation, and most of the deal litigation not 
only involved Delaware firms but also took place in Delaware.13 Suits 
were consequential then, because firms that were sued experienced a 
statistically significant higher incidence of deals that did not close, and 
deals that did close yielded their shareholders increased returns. 
Hence, the deal-focused suits in that former era could be seen, on the 
whole, as positive.14 
However, at the beginning of this decade, the frequency and 
composition of deal-focused litigation dramatically changed. For 
example, Matthew Cain and Professor Steven Davidoff Solomon 
report that in 2012, there were 121 transactions worth over $100 
 
cc/N9BM-BWFQ] (reporting a dismissal rate of 40.3 percent for securities class actions filed from 
1998 to 2003), with ELAINE BUCKBERG, TODD FOSTER & RONALD I. MILLER, NERA ECON. 
CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: ARE 
WORLDCOM AND ENRON THE NEW STANDARD? 3 (2005), http://www.nera.com/content/
dam/nera/publications/archive1/Recent_Trends_07.2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZRK-6KEQ] 
(reporting a dismissal rate of 20.3 percent for securities class actions filed from 1991 to 1995). 
 10. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1995) (narrowing the scope of Securities 
Act section 12(a)(2) to public offers that are registered or that are public in nature but qualify for 
an exemption from registration); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 654–55 (1988) (limiting defendants 
under Securities Act section 12 to those who transfer title or solicit for financial gain). 
 11. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158–63 (2008) 
(explaining that if one actively participates in a scheme to defraud, but does not make the 
document that misled the plaintiff, there is no violation of the antifraud provision); Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731–55 (1975) (limiting standing under the antifraud 
provision to those who purchase or sell in connection with the fraud).  
 12. Indeed, within the long shadow of securities litigation, we find seemingly parasitic 
tagalong derivative suits that seek relief based on failures of oversight on the part of the board of 
directors of companies settling securities fraud suits, in which plaintiffs allege that various lapses 
contributed to the misrepresentations that gave rise to the securities violation. See Stephen J. 
Choi, Jessica Erickson & Adam C. Pritchard, Piling On? An Empirical Study of Parallel 
Derivative Suits 2–4 (NYU Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-05, 
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2703509 [https://perma.cc/Z4QV-WGJ8].  
 13. C.N.V. Krishnan, Ronald W. Masulis, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, 
Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1250–54 (2012). 
 14. Id. 
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million, and 111 of them experienced deal litigation.15 They also found 
that shareholder suits accompanied 92 percent of mergers and 
acquisitions transactions in excess of $100 million.16 Moreover, about 
50 percent of these deals resulted in litigation in more than one 
jurisdiction.17 Thus, we find ample reason to believe that more is afoot 
in corporate litigation than an abundance of potential wrongdoing. The 
combined evidence of tagalong suits, the rapid increase in the 
percentage of deals breeding litigation, and the fact that multiple suits 
are filed in multiple forums invite the supposition that the explosion of 
litigation is driven by the quest for fees and not a rise in fiduciary 
misconduct. 
The explosion in the volume of deal-related litigation is not the 
only suggestion that such litigation is an abuse of process. An 
important study by Professors Jill Fisch, Sean Griffith, and Steven 
Davidoff Solomon also piques concern. The study closely examined 
453 acquisitions from 2005 through 2012, 319 of which involved deal-
related litigation.18 The authors found that amendments of the merger 
terms did not appear to increase shareholder approval of the merger. 
This is startling because improving merger terms would be expected to 
increase support among shareholders.19 The authors also studied the 
impact of additional disclosure that was provided through settlement 
 
 15. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2013, at 1–2 
(The Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 236, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2377001 [https://perma.cc/TSF4-S738]; see also 
ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER 
LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2012 M&A LITIGATION 1 
(2013) http://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/2012-Shareholder-Litigation-Involving
-M-and-A.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HFW-UBGJ] (“Among deals valued over $100 million, 93 
percent were challenged, with an average of 4.8 lawsuits filed per deal.”). For speculation on the 
underlying causes of these developments, see John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is 
Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 643–51 (2012); Sean J. Griffith & 
Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 
1066–70 (2013); Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative 
Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 
1788–91 (2012). 
 16. Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 15, at 2. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn 
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. 
REV. 557, 579 (2015). 
 19. Id. at 585–87. While disclosure-only settlements yielded no statistically significant impact 
on negative voting, as hypothesized, the amendment of merger agreements prompted more votes 
overall, including more “yes” votes. Id. Settlements that improved merger consideration 
produced more observable voting changes than settlements that changed merger terms, but they 
did not change the amount of consideration. Id. 
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of the litigation. Information provided through settlements customarily 
reveals negative information about the deal or qualifies the 
information provided by management. Even though the authors 
expected that such additional disclosures would negatively impact 
shareholder approval, they found only slight evidence of such an 
impact. 20 In combination, their findings raise the question of whether 
deal litigation resulting only in additional disclosure is socially harmful 
because it produces no observable benefits. 
We thus see history repeating itself in the corporate deal context, 
as we witness another explosion of litigation in a very short time period. 
Part I of this article reviews recent trends in deal-focused litigation, 
highlighting recent reforms that impact the frequency of suits. Others 
have noted that a possible explanation for the earlier rise, and the more 
recent ebb, of deal litigation is the ways in which these legal 
developments have affected the incentives of plaintiffs’ counsel in 
these suits. This Article, while not disagreeing with this assessment, 
adds a new perspective on what we witnessed. Part II argues that 
corporate norms are at the core of any perceived litigiousness in the 
corporate realm. The Article separates the norms into two distinct 
groups: “aspirational norms” and “arbiter norms.” While these two 
groups are distinct from one another, they share a common feature—
inherent overbreadth—which invites litigation that produces 
inconsequential results. Part III probes several paradoxical qualities of 
corporate norms. These paradoxes suggest that corporate norms are 
more fragile than we might believe desirable, so courts should be even 
more attentive to nurturing them. In Part IV, the Article concludes by 
examining how to prevent weaknesses in the settlement process from 
consuming corporate norms. It proposes that any review of a 
settlement must focus on the norm that is central to the suit, rather than 
on the settlement’s terms themselves. 
I.  STEPS TAKEN TO STEM THE RISING TIDE OF DEAL LITIGATION 
The most glaring statistic within the deal-litigation data set is that 
deals invariably attract not only litigation, but litigation occurring in 
multiple forums. In 2012, 93 percent of mergers and acquisitions deals 
worth more than $100 million were accompanied by shareholder suits 
(the percentage rose to 96 percent for deals exceeding $500 million), 
 
 20. Id. at 561. 
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with an average of 4.8 suits filed per transaction.21 Although 
Delaware’s share of multiforum suits grew from 2009 to 2012, a 
significant percentage of such suits spilled across state lines,22 
challenging comity as competing forums each jealously regarded their 
jurisdictional interests. Invariably, the court of the corporation’s 
domicile believes it should enjoy the dominant voice in the dispute.23  
The multiforum aspect of the litigation-explosion debate has now 
been sensibly dealt with by the prevalence of forum-selection bylaws.24 
Since 2015, a Delaware statute25 has authorized forum-selection 
bylaws, and such provisions have been judicially approved since at least 
2013.26 Though there are many varieties of forum-selection bylaws, the 
 
 21. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 15, at 1. 
 22. Id. at 2. 
 23. See generally La. Mun. Police Emps., Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313 (Del. Ch. 2012), 
rev’d, 74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013) (illustrating that a court of corporate domicile, Delaware, cannot 
ignore another court’s dismissal of a case, even when the Delaware court believes that the other 
court misapplied Delaware law). While the Delaware-based litigation resulted in a dismissal, the 
California federal district court was reversed. See Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137, 1141–42 
(9th Cir. 2014). See generally George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion 
Problem, 100 VA. L. REV. 261 (2014) (describing the preclusive nature of shareholder litigation). 
 24. The call for such bylaws and their justification was sensibly developed in Joseph A. 
Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical 
Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333 (2012), which traces the development and pattern of early 
forum-selection bylaws. 
 25. Act of June 24, 2015, 80 Del. Laws, ch. 40, § 3 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 
(2015)). Although I recognize the desirability of forum-selection bylaws, I continue to take issue 
with the notion that such bylaw provisions are contractually based. Although the statute in 
Delaware now authorizes such provisions, that statute only applies to Delaware corporations, 
does not directly address the propriety—let alone the wisdom—of the board unilaterally initiating 
a provision that changes a long-standing feature of the shareholder franchise, and it does not 
address other bylaw initiatives that boards may undertake that intrude on prerogatives of the 
shareholders. See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 257, 290–91 (2015). And the question of consent related to the board’s unilateral adoption 
of such a provision is questionable. See Deborah A. DeMott, Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted 
Through an Agency Lens, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 269, 274–75 (2015) (explaining that a grant of 
authority to a board to amend bylaws is too attenuated for shareholders to expect that the 
authority would be exercised to change the rules by which shareholder suits can be maintained); 
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 BUS. LAW. 161, 168–73 (2014) 
(explaining that consent is central to governance so that such a bylaw provision is vulnerable on 
this requirement). Indeed, a board’s unilateral adoption of such a sensible provision raises 
important governance questions flowing from why the board did not seek shareholder approval. 
 26. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 942−43, 963 (Del. Ch. 
2013). An important impetus for the widespread early adoption of forum-selection bylaws was 
dicta provided by Vice Chancellor Laster. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 
960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum 
would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations 
are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity 
disputes.”). 
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most common provision reflects a preference for the forum of the state 
of incorporation27 while also according the board of directors authority 
to “waive” the selected forum in favor of another forum where a suit is 
pending.28 
Another significant development is a 2016 Delaware decision, In 
re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,29 which confronted concerns 
associated with the rise of disclosure-only settlements. The court 
established a new and heightened standard by which “disclosure-only 
settlements” are evaluated.30 The previously well-established standard 
in Delaware for judicial review of settlements inquired broadly into 
“the reasonableness of the ‘give’ and the ‘get’”31 when evaluating the 
claim and possible defenses. But in Trulia, Inc., Chancellor Bouchard 
aimed squarely at the concerns captured in the data examined by Fisch, 
Griffin, and Davidoff Solomon, holding that disclosure-only 
settlements must satisfy a newly established “plainly material” 
standard whereby 
the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material 
misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the 
proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing 
more than disclosure claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning the 
sale process, [provided that] the record shows that such claims have 
been investigated sufficiently.32 
 
 27. See, e.g., CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, CONF. BD. GOVERNANCE CTR., TRENDS IN EXCLUSIVE 
FORUM BYLAWS 4 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411715 [https://perma.cc/Y9CK-YFFW] 
(relating a shift from specifying the Delaware Court of Chancery as the exclusive forum to naming 
courts in the state as a whole). A bylaw choosing the state court of the company’s principal place 
of business has also been upheld. City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 
229, 240 (Del. Ch. 2014) (upholding a North Carolina designation for a Delaware-incorporated 
firm).  
 28. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate 
Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325, 402 
(2013) (observing that such a waiver provision is akin to the “fiduciary out” clause that is 
frequently required for contracts and bylaw provisions that can restrain boards from choosing a 
course of action that on the particular set of facts is in the better interests of the corporation). 
 29. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 30. Id. at 891. The broad criteria for settlements is set forth in Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 
53–58 (Del. 1991). 
 31. In re Trulia, Inc., 129 A.3d at 891 (quoting In re Activision Blizzard Inc. S’holder Litig., 
124 A.3d 1025, 1043 (Del. Ch. 2015)).  
 32. Id. at 898. Trulia, Inc. and Chancellor Bouchard join a distinctive line of recent cases 
questioning such settlements. See Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic 
Problem of Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 904 (2016) (closely reviewing 
numerous recent Delaware opinions that have not only cast a skeptical eye toward settlements 
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Trulia, Inc. is a structured response to the malaise among courts 
that have increasingly approached disclosure-only settlements 
skeptically.33 Disclosure-only settlements provide supplemental 
disclosures to the shareholders but do not change the amount of 
consideration or other deal terms for the challenged transactions, and 
are quite common in suits in the mergers and acquisitions context.34 
Indeed, some commentators have even suggested a prophylactic 
approach of denying fee awards when only this remedy is extracted.35 
Disclosure-only settlements, especially in the context of the dramatic 
rise in deal-focused litigation, cast a dark shadow over shareholder 
litigation.36 As discussed earlier, the study by Fisch, Griffin, and 
Davidoff Solomon found that disclosures provided as a consequence of 
settlements had very little impact on shareholder voting. This invites 
the question of why suits would be brought to produce a settlement—
disclosure—that is inconsequential. 
An irresistible explanation is the well-known problem of 
attorneys’ incentives: defense lawyers are eager to enable their clients’ 
transactions to proceed as agreed, so they offer plaintiffs’ counsel 
insignificant disclosures as a small price to overcome the uncertainty of 
a trial and the costs of delaying the transaction until the matter is tried. 
 
but many times have either rejected settlements or considered their weakness when considering 
fee requests from their counsel).  
 33. See, e.g., In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 
5458041, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (approving, reluctantly, support of such settlements in 
light of past precedents, but suggesting the force of the past is waning); In re Allied Healthcare 
S’holder Litig., No. 652188/2011, 2015 WL 6499467, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2015) (rejecting 
a settlement with the observation that “in the area of derivative litigation, a culture has developed 
that results in cases of relatively worthless settlements (derivative actions are rarely tried to a 
verdict) that discontinue the action (with releases) resulting in the corporate defendants not 
opposing an agreed upon legal fee to class counsel”).  
 34. One study found that in 81 percent of the settlements studied that disclosure was the only 
result produced in merger cases. DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 15, at 6. 
 35. See Fisch et al., supra note 18, at 615 (suggesting that because disclosure-only settlements 
provide no change in voting outcomes, fee requests in disclosure-only settlements should be 
denied and disclosure-focused deal litigation should be transferred to the federal courts). 
 36. One deeply experienced jurist, Vice Chancellor Laster, laments that disclosure-only 
settlements are characterized by their nonadversarial nature, with pressures to settle created by 
expedited discovery as well as the deal’s own timetable. J. Travis Laster, A Milder Prescription 
for the Peppercorn Settlement Problem in Merger Litigation, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 129, 149 
(2015). Chief Justice Strine also emphasizes deal-related pressures adversely affecting the court 
or parties’ ability to fully assess the benefits of disclosure. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing 
at 1, In re Monogram Biosciences, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 4703-CC 2010 WL 9044697 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 26, 2010) (“I’m not going to blow up this settlement about [the potential lack of corporate 
benefit]. This type of litigation puts defendants in an awkward situation and actually puts 
investors as a class in an awkward situation, because of the potential toll it extracts.”). 
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Plaintiffs’ counsel, preferring the certainty of a settlement and the 
award of fees, accepts the inconsequential settlement. Thus, disclosure-
only settlements are an efficient medium for addressing deal litigation: 
the defense lawyers’ clients are happy, and the plaintiffs’ counsel are 
paid. As developed in the next Part, this perspective could be accurate, 
but cannot be assessed fully without a deep consideration of the 
underlying norms that are central to the dispute. 
Disclosure-only settlements have caused concern because they 
frequently provide release of not just claims raised in the complaint, 
but of future claims that are broader than those alleged in the 
complaint.37 The potential abuse here is in allowing defendants to 
escape penalties for their misconduct too easily because of a hasty 
settlement by plaintiffs’ counsel. In this regard, note that under Trulia, 
Inc., the release must be “narrowly circumscribed” to claims made 
regarding the challenged transaction, and those claims must have been 
“investigated sufficiently.”38 This is an important contribution of 
Trulia, Inc.’s formulation, and this feature of its approach is connected 
to the waiver provision that is prevalent in forum-selection clauses. 
A fear endemic to multiforum litigation is the reverse auction, 
whereby defense counsel wrests a global settlement from one of the 
litigants, which leads to dismissal of suits in other forums where 
attorneys demanded better terms.39 The Supreme Court entered this 
area in Matsushita Industrial Co. v. Epstein,40 holding that full faith and 
credit must be accorded settlements, unless it is shown that the settled 
claim lacked adequate representation.41 This is a difficult showing to 
 
 37. Indeed, this was very much an issue in In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 
890 (Del. Ch. 2016). See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 12, 
Haverhill Ret. Sys. v. Asali, No. 9474-VCL, 2015 WL 3582361 (Del. Ch. June 8, 2015) (“I mean, 
the biggest problem I have here is, it seems to me that you got a bunch of very little, and what 
you’re giving is a broad release in the context of a company where its corporate governance 
doesn’t inspire any confidence whatsoever.” (quoting Vice Chancellor Laster)); see Sean J. 
Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine 
on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2015) (“Defendants typically insist upon and receive releases 
extending to ‘all possible claims, known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, arising out of or 
relating to the events that were the subject of the litigation.’”).  
 38. In re Trulia, Inc., 129 A.3d at 898. 
 39. For an account of how a disclosure-only settlement was barely avoided in a matter that 
ultimately yielded a settlement approaching $100 million, see supra note 32.  
 40. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996). 
 41. Id. at 386–87 (upholding a Delaware state court’s approval of a settlement that barred 
the prosecution of all claims, including those under federal securities law, arising from the same 
transaction, even though the jurisdiction for the prosecution of the securities law claims was 
exclusively in federal courts). 
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establish.42 The waiver provisions in forum-selection clauses allow 
corporate counsel to sample the appetite for settlement among 
competing shareholder suits, raising the prospect that even meritorious 
claims will not be adequately redressed or inquiries into whether there 
are unasserted claims will never be allowed. Thus, wresting a sweeping 
settlement from an eagerly compliant plaintiff’s counsel can be seen as 
purchasing “deal insurance.”43 Trulia, Inc. addresses the reverse 
auction by rejecting the settlement’s inclusion of claims not framed in 
the complaint. To the extent Trulia, Inc. is followed, defendants are 
deterred from shopping among multiple plaintiffs raising differing 
claims with the intent of settling all claims with the most compliant 
plaintiff. 
There is already evidence that growing skepticism of disclosure-
only settlements and the ubiquity of forum-selection bylaws are having 
an impact on the volume and conduct of deal litigation. In 2015, the 
percentage of such suits declined to 87.7 percent of deals over $100 
million, and the rate for the fourth quarter was 21.4 percent. There also 
was about a 50 percent decline in multijurisdiction litigation from the 
2012 high.44 The apparently downward trend in the volume of deal 
litigation caused by these two procedural developments is calming; 
however, the decline observed may be aberrational and, in any case, a 
decline in scale does not eradicate concern that the current approach 
nurtures bad settlements. This Article, by discussing how corporate 
norms facilitate seemingly inconsequential litigation, suggests how 
settlements can better be reviewed to strengthen norms and improve 
the conduct of shareholder suits. 
 
 42. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the state court 
had addressed adequacy of counsel when approving the global settlement, so there could be no 
collateral attack on that determination). 
 43. Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 20, In re Intermune, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 
10086-VCN, 2015 WL 9481182 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015) (“This is a universal problem. The 
defendants want total peace. They do some . . . relatively minimal disclosures, and they buy deal 
insurance.” (quoting Vice Chancellor Noble)); see also Transcript of Settlement Hearing at *1, In 
re Monogram Biosciences, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 4703-CC, 2010 WL 9044697 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
26, 2010) (expressing a reluctance to “blow up” a disclosure-only settlement because doing so 
would create uncertainty regarding whether a value-enriching transaction would occur, given the 
ongoing litigation risks (quoting Vice Chancellor Strine)). 
 44. Mathew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, at 1, 3 (Jan. 
14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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II.  THE NATURE OF CORPORATE NORMS 
Corporate law is but a component of the larger body of 
organizational law whose focus extends beyond identifying the rights 
and obligations of the organization’s participants; corporate law 
embraces governance mechanisms that mediate the different utility 
curves of managers and owners and among owners. Because 
corporations are now more likely to be formed where there is a 
substantial group of nonmanager owners, corporate law is a 
challenging arena for mediating the vastly different utilities. 
Not all regulation of managers, however, comes out of the barrels 
of state corporate statutes and legal doctrine. Incentives arising 
through private ordering, such as bonuses that await high-performing 
managers, address the objectives of corporate law. Such arrangements 
are nurtured by legal rules that accord great deference to employment 
agreements. Indeed, the deference that is customarily accorded actors 
in corporate law is so substantial as to suggest that much of corporate 
law is lawless, except for the latent power of owners to vote their 
representatives out of office. 
So viewed, commentators question why, given the lax standards 
by which officers and boards of directors are judged, we do not observe 
a greater number of badly managed firms than we do.45 The answer to 
this question is that managers do not live by bread (that is, financial 
gain) alone; they act with a high awareness of social norms. Managers 
garner satisfaction from doing the “right” thing and avoid the sting of 
 
 45. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, 
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1626 (2001) (arguing that 
the business judgment rule is designed and applied to assure that enforcement is almost entirely 
nonlegal, resulting in many fewer reported cases of director “malpractice” than in other areas of 
law); see also Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016–17 (1997) (examining how traditional legal constraints work as well 
as they do and making the case that judicial opinions contribute to the construction of social 
norms that impact actors’ behavior in corporate transactions). The duty of care is the lens through 
which stewardship is evaluated. The obligation of care lacks any substantive content by its 
requirement that actors have a “rational,” as contrasted with a “reasonable,” basis for their 
actions. In place of a substantive inquiry, courts regularly review the processes employed by the 
board to reach the decision, an orientation whose narrative can be expected to have wider 
application to practices followed by others than the more focused examination of whether the 
decision made was a reasonable one. There is indeed more substantive bite with respect to the 
officers and directors’ duty of loyalty. However, with rescission or restitution customarily 
prescribed as the remedy for a breach, there are ample grounds to question whether the sanction 
is set at too inefficient a level. Nonetheless, if reported decisions are evidence of the prevalence 
of disloyal aspiration by corporate managers, the instances of unfaithfulness are quite low.  
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loss of reputation that accompanies conduct deemed “wrong.”46 The 
level of care by directors, therefore, is largely driven not by a fear of 
liability or desire for financial gain, but rather by directors’ 
expectations of what other actors would do in like circumstances.47 
With this understanding of where norms fall within the corporate law 
constellation, we can see that the belief system of corporate actors is 
an important component of the highly textured realm of corporate law. 
That is, the guidance that corporate actors respond to is what they 
believe others will do, as well as how they believe they will be regarded 
if they act otherwise. 
Of course, the degree to which attention will be given to 
expectations is proportional to the actor’s understanding of how widely 
held a particular norm is. A disputed or weak norm cannot be expected 
to have as much (or any) impact as one that is believed to be adhered 
to by a significant portion of the relevant social group.48 From this 
perspective, judicial opinions have a dual impact. The court’s 
conclusions, which usually follow a narrative of the corporate actors’ 
behavior, signal what practices are acceptable and unacceptable, and 
communicate that norms are indeed shared by others within the belief 
group.49 Judicial opinions are thereby a bully pulpit for constructing 
corporate norms, serving as a central mechanism by which corporate 
actors receive social cues. 
In this way, courts are important norm intermediaries. Judicial 
opinions celebrate role models and define and condemn skullduggery. 
They map the straight road that fiduciaries should follow.50 These 
messages elevate the norm’s impact. Therefore, corporate litigation 
serves functions aside from directly disciplining management 
misbehavior when ownership and management are separated. They 
 
 46. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1259–
60 (1999) (explaining that actors “weigh the pain of shame, the pleasure of conformity, and the 
external costs and benefits of adherence and nonadherence” when considering whether to follow 
a social norm). 
 47. Id. at 1263. 
 48. Id. at 1291. 
 49. Whether it is the rule that arises or is confirmed in a particular case, or the narrative’s 
confirmation of practices deemed acceptable or unacceptable, the result can be expected to 
impact the internal preferences of corporate actors. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, 
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 
1807–10 (2001) (stressing that the norms of trust and trustworthiness are central to efficient 
operations). 
 50. Id. at 1796–97. 
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also contribute to extra judicial enforcement through the production of 
social norms.51  
The role and recognition of norms is especially desirable in 
business organizations. The presence of multiple actors in an ever-
changing environment contributes mightily to the inability of the 
parties to protect their interests through contracting. Furthermore, 
even though some participants within the organization necessarily 
enjoy significant information, the volatile business environment makes 
resort to contracting a less than fulsome response. Because parties are 
necessarily subject to the bounded rationality of their present 
environment, their contracts are necessarily incomplete.52 With the 
inability to write “good” or complete contracts, social norms add body 
to open-textured standards and can be thought of as providing an 
efficient response. In the absence of norms influencing a board’s 
action, much of the contract would remain indeterminate and 
unreviewable. 
In light of both the importance of social norms and the role of 
courts in transmitting norms to corporate actors, we should view courts 
as norm engineers when they resolve corporate disputes. A holding in 
an individual case is important, but it is the end of a sermon on the 
good, the bad, and the ugly. To the extent these characteristics can be 
supported by references to practices embraced by others, there can be 
a stronger expectation that the prescribed norm will be internalized. 
This would be the true import of the case. 
A. Aspirational Norms 
The most ubiquitous norms in the corporate setting are the 
materiality standard and the business judgment rule. The former 
straddles the federal and state arenas, whereas the latter does its duty 
solely in the state corporate context. While the content of each norm is 
quite different from the other, they share a common characteristic: 
each embodies an aspirational standard, the breach of which does not 
necessarily lead to an injury, or at least not one that is compensable. 
We need look no further than the Supreme Court’s materiality 
standard to understand that it reaches information that would not alter 
 
 51. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 45, at 1650 (reasoning that what governs a firm’s 
internal affairs and the aspirations of its actors are norms, which the authors refer to as nonlegal 
enforceable rules and standards). 
 52. Oliver Hart, Norms and the Theory of the Firm, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1703 (2001) 
(explaining the many forces that cause contracts in the organizational setting to be incomplete). 
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how a shareholder voted, had the information not been misstated or 
omitted: 
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how 
to vote. . . . It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable 
investor to change his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a 
showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, 
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the 
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there 
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available.53 
It should be noted that the above quote arose in the context of a 
challenge to a merger, so the definition established was very much 
connected not only to the explosion of such deal-related litigation, but 
also to the findings of Fisch, Griffith, and Davidoff Solomon, as 
Delaware is among the states that embrace the federal materiality 
formulation.54 The resulting standard, as reflected by the italicized 
portion above, deems material many pieces of information that have 
no consequential effects on the investor or shareholder’s ultimate 
action in reliance on the “total mix” of information presented. 
The Supreme Court has fed concerns about overbreadth by 
holding that causality in aggregate decisionmaking, such as 
stockholders’ approval via a proxy solicitation, does not turn on “the 
particular defect in the solicitation materials” but on whether the act 
of solicitation “was an essential link in the accomplishment of the 
transaction.”55 In both state and federal litigation, this oblique 
guidance has come to mean that, when proxies allegedly contain a 
material omission or misstatement, causality is determined objectively 
by asking whether votes of the solicited stockholders were necessary to 
 
 53. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1975) (emphasis added).  
 54. It should be noted that Delaware, in its initial development of the duty of candor for 
corporate fiduciaries, applied a somewhat narrower test whereby the duty of candor mandated 
that fiduciaries disclose “all information in their possession germane to the transaction in issue. 
And by ‘germane’ [the court] mean[t] . . . information such as a reasonable shareholder would 
consider important in deciding whether to sell or retain stock.” Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 
383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977). Later the court substituted “material facts” for “germane facts.” 
See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985). 
 55. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite, Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970). 
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approve the transaction;56 the focus is not whether any shareholder 
vote was acquired because of the alleged misrepresentation. 
The operation of the business judgment rule mirrors the 
materiality standard, as it too calls for much higher standards than are 
ultimately actionable. In this way, the rule houses both an aspirational 
standard and a standard of review. The aspirational standard specifies 
how actors should carry out an activity or discharge a particular role. 
By contrast, the standard of review is the manner by which a court 
should judge the actor’s actual conduct to determine whether to grant 
relief. The similarity between the business judgment rule and 
materiality standard is that, just as a violation of the aspirational 
standard for directors does not itself establish liability on the part of 
the director, the commission of a material misrepresentation in a proxy 
solicitation is not actionable when the outcome would not have been 
changed if the correct information were known by the shareholder 
when the defendant holds the requisite number of shares for approval 
(or for that matter, a material misstatement in a company’s annual 
report is not actionable without evidence that it caused an economic 
loss to the investor). 
An excellent example of the distinction between an aspirational 
norm and a standard of review is the Model Business Corporation Act 
(Model Act), which sets forth aspirational standards for directors, such 
as the obligation to “discharge their duties with the care that a person 
in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar 
circumstances.”57 This standard is indistinguishable from the standard 
of negligence in tort, an area of law in which the aspirational standard 
and standard of review do not separate. In contrast, the Model Act 
separately identifies the considerations for determining when a breach 
of the aspirational standard is actionable.58 Here, a claim sounding in 
negligence only arises when “the director was not informed to an 
extent the director reasonably believed appropriate in the 
circumstances.”59 A circumstance in which a director was reasonably 
informed of the facts, but made the wrong decision, would not be 
 
 56. See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1107–08 (1991) (dismissing a 
suit where state law required a bare majority of the shares to approve a merger, and the defendant 
owned 85 percent of the voting power). 
 57. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1984) (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. § 8.31. 
 59. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(B). 
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actionable under the Model Act (although it would be in a tort-based 
negligence action). 
The gap between the business judgment rule and the negligence 
standard is explained by the differing contexts in which they are 
applied. In many tort actions, bad results are highly correlated with bad 
decisionmaking: 
In the paradigm negligence case involving a relatively simple decision, 
such as an automobile accident, there is often little difference 
between decisions that turn out badly and bad decisions. In such 
cases, typically only one reasonable decision could have been made 
under the circumstances, and decisions that turn out badly therefore 
almost inevitably turn out to have been bad decisions.60 
As the choices before the decisionmaker increase, as they do in 
business decisions, so do the possible outcomes; hence, it does not 
necessarily follow that a bad result following the Ford Motor Company 
directors’ decision to build the Edsel was necessarily the product of a 
bad decision.61 More likely it was the product of a risky decision. 
Moreover, within this context, there is a grave risk that the judgment 
of whether the aspirational standard was breached will be subject to 
hindsight bias.62 This reality in judging the actors’ actual conduct needs 
to be balanced against the understanding that in many instances, the 
shareholders’ interests are best served by the directors preferring 
riskier choices. Thus, the difference between the aspirational standard 
and the standard of review furthers the interests of shareholders. 
We should also understand that materiality serves goals broader 
than protecting shareholders and investors from transactions that will 
adversely impact their wealth. In the proxy context, materiality guides 
the information reasonably believed necessary to apprise the 
reasonable shareholder of the choices before her. Whether we adhere 
to the view that shareholder voting assumes importance because it 
addresses the “incomplete contract” problem that is embedded in the 
“nexus of contract” perspective of the corporation, or serves a 
legitimizing function in the “director primacy” view of the corporation, 
or is rationalized as the owners’ ability to reward or discipline 
 
 60. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 625 (11th unabr. ed. 2014). 
 61. For fascinating accounts of the Edsel’s failure and the multiple forces contributing to it, 
see generally ROBERT DAINES, EDSEL: THE MOTOR INDUSTRY’S TITANIC (Atlantic 1994); Tom 
Dicke, The Edsel: Forty Years as a Symbol of Failure, 43 J. POPULAR CULTURE 486 (2010). 
 62. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 60, at 625. 
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management through their reliance on the simplifying heuristic of 
changes in the firm’s share price, the ritual of voting depends on ex 
ante determinations of information the shareholders need to vote.63 
Thus, the standard calls for counsel preparing the proxy statement to 
include a range of information that is broader than that which would 
determine the outcome of a vote. 
But why is this so? To answer this question, we begin with the 
indeterminacy of a materiality standard that includes only facts so 
significant to the objectively qualified investor as to change her vote or 
decision to purchase. Similar to the prevailing, more inclusive standard 
from TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,64 a standard focused on 
what would change behavior, would itself be an indeterminate 
standard that invites hindsight bias.65 When judging ex post what 
should have been disclosed, events that had come to pass would be seen 
as having a higher probability or magnitude than would have been 
assigned ex ante to the same disclosure item. 
The heterogeneity of shareholders and investors can be seen as 
calling for a broader disclosure test. It is also likely easier to reach 
agreement on the types of information users wish to consider than it is 
to isolate items so significant as to change their choice. And the 
outcome under either standard can be expected to be context-specific, 
a reality recognized by the standard’s reference to the “total mix” of 
information. Because the standard is an objective one, the “total mix” 
does not sweep in the peculiar information needs of the individual user. 
This prevents sampling among investors as a means of establishing a 
microcosm by which to discern materiality to the objectively qualified 
investors; unless carefully crafted, the sample would not be statistically 
representative. Moreover, in a large corporation, street-name holdings 
 
 63. Corporate law academics are of course not monolithic; we approach corporate problems 
with very different perspectives on what a corporation is and more specifically the content and 
purpose of good corporate practices. Building on the work of Ronald Coase, the contractarian 
school views the corporation as little more than a web of contracts. Contracting is of course not 
costless, and prescience does not exist. Thus, voting is a way of filling gaps in the contract, hence 
the view that many issues that arise among owners and managers in the corporation are the 
product of incomplete contracts. Academics also have widely differing views on the relative 
power and prerogatives of shareholders versus managers (officers and directors). Some favor the 
former, being adherents of the shareholder primacy view, while others favor the latter, the 
director primacy view. See generally Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 
62 VAND. L. REV. 129 (2009) (reviewing various theories on why shareholders enjoy the right to 
vote). 
 64. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1975). 
 65. Id. at 449 (“An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”). 
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with a large group of objecting beneficial owners, coupled with the 
inherent difficulties of learning the unique endowments of all holders, 
would likely not ensure that the sample chosen was a representative 
one. 
Most importantly, the materiality standard embodies an 
important public policy choice of favoring the market in the case of 
materiality’s role in securities transactions, or investors’ collective 
judgment in the case of disclosures regarding transactions that call for 
a shareholder vote. That is, a narrower materiality standard would 
naturally cover an equally narrower range of information users, such 
as shareholders and investors. The current formulation of materiality, 
whereby actionable material misrepresentations are less inclusive than 
disclosures that are mandated because they are material, is something 
of a social compromise. The compromise provides information users 
with disclosures they wish while at the same time insulating individuals 
and transactions from legal consequences, except when the 
misrepresentation rises to a level believed to cause consequential 
harm. 
B. Arbiter Norms 
The business judgment rule and the materiality standard are 
illustrative of corporate norms that are aspirational and exist because 
they are believed to best serve societal objectives. Those objectives are 
defined by something other than compensable wrongdoing. While this 
can easily be said of norms generally, much of corporate law and 
corporate litigation (at least in Delaware) involve norms that serve a 
quite different purpose: providing a party with a means to involve a 
court and thereby obtain an impartial assessment of distinct 
transactions. Such a norm is referred to here as an arbiter norm. 
The paradigmatic example of such a norm is the Revlon doctrine, 
which is implicated when the board of directors favors a transaction 
whose structure is such that, upon consummation, it will be the last 
opportunity for shareholders to receive a control premium upon 
disposition of the firm.66 In this context, the directors’ actions are 
subjected to higher judicial scrutiny to ascertain if they fulfilled their 
 
 66. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) 
(setting forth the ruling that serves as the progenitor of the “auctioneer” role that directors 
assume when a transaction is the last opportunity for the shareholders to participate in a control 
premium). 
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duty as “auctioneers” of the firm.67 Inherent in the standard is 
ambiguity regarding what the auctioneer standard requires. In some 
contexts, this standard has been violated by the failure to actively 
pursue other bids for the firm, whereas in other contexts, the directors 
in the Revlon moment are excused from the need to “shop” the firm.68 
What we find in the Revlon jurisprudence is not a model of what 
constitutes an auction or conduct appropriate for an auctioneer; we 
instead find close assessments of whether the sum of the directors’ 
conduct is consistent with the view that they acted to advance the 
stockholders’ interests.69 
A similar lack of definiteness surrounds courts’ reviews of 
defensive measures by boards of directors. In Delaware, the operative 
standard is whether the challenged action was either preclusive or 
coercive.70 Each of these terms is ambiguous, highly context-specific, 
and inquired into only after the court is satisfied that the independent 
directors approved the action and did so because they believed in good 
faith that the unwanted suitor posed a threat to the corporation or its 
stockholders. A significant feature of both auction and defensive-
maneuver inquiries is that the burden of proof is on the board of 
directors, not the plaintiff.71 This allocation of the burden of proof tilts 
in favor of the complaining party, at least to the extent of moving the 
salient facts to court. 
Arbiter norms that today regulate so much of managers’ conduct 
in takeovers can be traced to the rich case law surrounding the officers’ 
and directors’ duty of loyalty. There, the bedrock principle for 
addressing self-dealing transactions is the placement of the burden of 
explanation and persuasion on the fiduciary whenever the fiduciary 
 
 67. See id. at 180. 
 68. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009) (reversing a lower 
court holding that directors breached their Revlon duties by failing to either conduct a market 
check or undertake an auction). This result was also suggested in Revlon itself. See Revlon, 506 
A.2d at 180 (“Favoritism for a white knight to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder might be 
justifiable when the latter’s offer adversely affects shareholder interests, but when bidders make 
relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot 
fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites . . . .”). 
 69. See, e.g., Lyondell Chem., 970 A.2d at 243–44 (reviewing closely multiple steps taken by 
directors to obtain the best price for a firm). 
 70. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386–88 (Del. 1995) (modifying the 
second step of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)). 
 71. Id. at 1374. 
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transacts business with her own firm.72 This principle was easily 
transferred to self-dealing in the acquisitions context so that in that 
setting, Delaware’s “entire fairness” standard encompasses both price 
and process, and just as with classic self-dealing contracts, the burden 
of proof is on the interested party. In each instance, the presence of 
financial self-interest removes the presumptions that attend arms-
length dealings.73 Indeed, we can see that just as developments 
regarding self-dealing contracts informed the approach to self-dealing 
in acquisitions, when the Delaware courts were presented with 
defensive maneuvers, they viewed their holdings through the self-
dealing lens, observing that directors’ and officers’ interests are 
affected by a change of control. The most recent developments in the 
acquisition area reinforce the self-interest orientation by focusing on 
whether certain governance procedures that are believed to remove 
the otherwise heavy hand of self-interest have been followed.74  
We therefore see that when the norm of noninterested behavior is 
breached, even if only technically, the strong presumption of propriety 
that normally applies disappears. If the transaction is challenged, an 
“entire fairness” inquiry arises with the burden of proof on the 
fiduciary. Stated differently, the consequence of a self-dealing 
transaction or conduct that is pregnant with the possibility of self-
interest is prophylactic, as these facts alone provide access to a neutral 
arbiter. Not surprisingly, therefore, claims of self-interest abound 
amidst mergers and acquisitions, because Delaware mergers and 
 
 72. See generally Norwood P. Beveridge, Interested Director Contracts at Common Law: 
Validation Under the Doctrine of Constructive Fraud, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 97 (1999) (tracing the 
development of the treatment of voidable and nonvoidable conflicts in the context of 
constructively fraudulent self-dealing transactions); Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?: 
Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966) (describing a classic study 
tracing the courts’ treatment of self-dealing transactions). 
 73. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (establishing, in a 
seminal way, the “entire fairness” standard for a parent company’s acquisition of its subsidiary). 
 74. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) (2011) (authorizing the so-called “streamlined 
back-end merger” whereby a friendly tender offer that secures a majority of the shares is followed 
by a merger with the bidder, without triggering the entire fairness standard); Kahn v. M&F 
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (stating that the entire fairness inquiry can be 
avoided if the parent agrees in advance to abide by the decision of a committee of the subsidiary 
that is truly independent and also conditions acquisition on an uncoerced vote of a majority of 
the minority shares); In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(implying that the entire fairness inquiry can be avoided for a short-form merger following a 
tender offer by a controlling stockholder that increases its ownership to effect the merger when 
the provided tender offer and merger price are the same, the tender offer is conditioned on a 
majority of the minority holders’ approval, and the controlling stockholder has not made 
retributive threats).  
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acquisitions jurisprudence is founded on broadly stated concerns 
regarding managerial self-interest. Delaware jurisprudence thus places 
a bullseye on deals, with the effect of inviting litigation consistent with 
the role of the arbiter norm. The result is not unexpected; it is endemic 
to the underlying substantive norm. 
III.  THE PARADOX OF CORPORATE NORMS 
Because of their overbreadth, corporate norms give rise to some 
interesting paradoxes. By understanding these paradoxes, we can 
hopefully make some headway in addressing the costs they impose. 
The foremost paradox discussed here flows from the fact that 
substantive standards intended to advance the interests of corporations 
and their owners by reducing managerial agency costs and facilitating 
corporate governance—such as full disclosure of material facts 
surrounding transactions—lead to seemingly inconsequential 
litigation. Thus, we are confronted by the complaint that well-meaning, 
albeit broad, norms merely give rise to another form of agency costs, 
namely those arising from spurious suits advanced by unscrupulous 
lawyers. As seen in Part II, aspirational and arbiter norms are of 
necessity broader than what constitutes culpable, and hence 
remediable, misconduct. The purposes served by the norms’ very 
existence are founded on policy objectives and practical considerations 
that transcend the protectable economic rights of the corporation or its 
owners. Consequently, in the space between the indeterminate 
standards of each norm and instances of actionable violations, we will 
find seemingly inconsequential litigation. This feeds our fears that the 
resulting inconsequential litigation is an abuse of process. 
One way to address the overbreadth conundrum is to reshape the 
substantive quality of the norms. The business judgment rule could be 
less hortatory, materiality could be narrowed to include only items that 
change decisions regarding how to vote, and deal-related norms could 
endow directors with the presumption of the business judgment rule in 
all instances. But obviously each substantive constriction of the norm 
sacrifices some of the social benefits of that norm. For example, ridding 
directors and officers of broad duties of care and loyalty may adversely 
impact their other-directedness. A narrower standard of materiality 
would produce less information that sectors of the investment 
community would find useful. And lifting the lash of possible scrutiny 
of change-of-control transactions may yield more problematic 
transactions. 
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Moreover, this course of action would reduce, likely substantially, 
the role courts play and can play in the production of norms. With less 
inclusive norms, there would be fewer opportunities for courts to 
affirm socially valuable conduct and condemn harmful behavior. 
Furthermore, the constriction of their content would make norms less 
aspirational. They would become disciplining standards, so that the 
benefits of aspirational norms in terms of prompting managers to excel 
beyond the minimal disciplinary standards would likely be 
compromised. 
Three decades ago, states did pursue a reductionist approach to 
what was believed to be an overly demanding aspirational norm of 
care. They adopted immunity shields whereby directors were insulated 
from damages suits unless they engaged in certain forms of purposeful 
or self-enriching misbehavior.75 Immunity shields were rapidly 
propelled into state corporate law by Smith v. Van Gorkom,76 in which 
the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors’ decision to sell a New 
York Stock Exchange–listed company at a nearly 50 percent premium 
was grossly negligent.77 Coincidental with the decision, the cyclical 
directors’ and officers’ insurance industry was at a point of too few 
insurance carriers for the demand for coverage that surged after Van 
Gorkom; companies then seeking directors’ and officers’ insurance 
found both premiums and deductible limits to be high. Thus, at the 
same moment that directors of Delaware corporations were shocked 
out of their complacency by Van Gorkom, they also found that the 
protection they enjoyed through insurance was not only more 
expensive but also provided less protection because of constricted 
coverage limits. Legislatures acted rapidly to restore directors to their 
earlier, blissful life by insulating them from fears that a momentary 
lapse would give rise to disproportionately large liability. 
Immunity shields, while shifting the focus of corporate litigation, 
did not dampen its frequency. Indeed, there are strong reasons to 
 
 75. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Directors’ Liability, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 
297–310 (1988) (reviewing forms of immunity shields closely). Immunity shields can also impact 
the materiality norm because directors who negligently commit a material misrepresentation in a 
proxy statement are protected from damages by the shield. Dixon v. ATI Ladish LLC, 667 F.3d 
891, 895 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 76. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7), as recognized in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 
2003). 
 77. Id. at 874 (holding that the directors of a public company who hastily agreed to sell the 
firm without a reasonable inquiry into its value committed gross negligence) 
COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2016  6:54 PM 
524 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:501 
suspect that a natural consequence of immunity shields is that 
directors’ decisions are today subject to more frequent and closer 
judicial scrutiny than they were before this legislative development; 
that is, an unintended consequence of immunity shields is stimulating 
norm production by the courts. If this is correct, we see the ultimate 
paradox for corporate norms. 
Before Van Gorkom, there were but a handful of cases holding 
that directors had breached their duty of care. Importantly, none of 
these cases involved public companies; most involved banks. The 
paucity of care violations in the long and rich history of corporate law 
(and related skullduggery) is regularly explained by the so-called 
deterrence trap, where it is reasoned that courts are unwilling to 
impose a sanction believed disproportionate to the defendant’s 
culpability.78 Translated to the corporate-care case, this means that 
courts will not impose liability on directors who negligently depart 
from the standard of care, even if that departure is deemed extreme, 
when the consequential damages are believed disproportionate to the 
level of fault. Immunity shields remove this concern when the court is 
asked to review a particular decision. 
Immunity shields also encourage, rather than discourage, deal-
based litigation. In a former era, an accusation that directors were 
careless in their approval of a transaction led to little judicial scrutiny 
because of the insulating qualities of the deterrence trap; courts 
resisted probing allegations which could expose well-meaning directors 
to liability grossly disproportionate to their momentary lapses of 
judgment. Following the wide adoption of immunity shields, with their 
preclusion of damages, equitable relief has been the common response 
to such challenges. We now witness more suits against deals and much 
more analysis of directors’ actions than occurred prior to the ubiquity 
of immunity shields.79 Thus, we see a second paradox of norms: a 
legislative response intended to insulate directors from liability has had 
the unintended effect of subjecting director actions to more and closer 
scrutiny. With courts freed of the deterrence trap, their production of 
norms is richer as they address what is commendable and condemnable 
director behavior. This enriches the tapestry of corporate law. 
 
 78. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards 
and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 627–28 (1983). For the 
view that courts have struck the right balance, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate 
Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 
798 (1984) (arguing that the value of the duty of care is in its “socializing and exhortative impact”). 
 79. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text. 
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A further development in the production of norms is how society 
subsidizes the enunciation of rights, regardless of any consequential 
harm. In an early, celebrated securities case, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite 
Co.,80 the Supreme Court established that a plaintiff who proves a 
technical violation of the federal proxy rules is entitled to be 
compensated by the corporation on whose behalf the suit was 
maintained, regardless of whether any damages were incurred. Mills 
alleged that the proxy used to obtain the Electric Auto-Lite 
shareholders’ approval of a merger with another company that owned 
54 percent of Electric Auto-Lite failed to disclose that all of the 
Electric Auto-Lite directors were the nominees of its merger partner.81 
Despite there being no consequential damages as a result of the 
disclosure gaffe, the Supreme Court established the important 
precedent that equity called for the corporation to reimburse the 
plaintiff’s reasonable litigation costs when the suit produced a benefit 
to the corporation.82 The Court found that establishing that a material 
omission had occurred was such a benefit when the proxy solicitation 
was necessary to effect the merger.83 Thus, the award of attorneys’ fees 
was based on a causal connection between the need to solicit proxies 
and the merger’s approval—not the omission itself.84 
In Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners,85 the Delaware Supreme 
Court similarly awarded fees after emphasizing the benefit that the 
plaintiff’s suit had conferred on the shareholders.86 Tandycrafts should 
be seen as an even stronger embrace of the practice of awarding fees 
to the plaintiff when a suit has benefitted the corporation or its 
shareholders. In that case, the plaintiff’s suit was brought on behalf of 
an individual, not on behalf of the corporation or its shareholders, and 
the plaintiff withdrew the suit after the corporation amended its proxy 
statement disclosures to address the omissions raised in the suit. 
Nonetheless, fees were awarded because the court believed the 
corrective disclosure benefitted the company and its shareholders and 
because the defendant was unable to establish that the supplemental 
disclosure was not a consequence of the plaintiff’s suit.87 
 
 80. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392–97 (1970). 
 81. Id. at 379–80. 
 82. Id. at 396–97. 
 83. Id. at 385. 
 84. Id. at 392. 
 85. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162 (Del. 1989). 
 86. Id. at 1165. 
 87. Id. at 1166. 
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It should be observed that both Mills and Tandycrafts, while 
differing in their approaches to causation, require more than the 
violation of an aspirational norm to reward the norm’s vindication. 
Nonetheless, causality in both cases is so loosely defined—requiring 
little more than correlative events—that the vindication of at least the 
norm of materiality calls for more than the violation of that aspirational 
norm. Indeed, Mills is even more liberal; there, the omission or 
misstatement of a material fact alone justified a fee award. In 
Tandycrafts there was the additional requirement that the suit must 
have prompted some corrective action. The harms arising from the 
laxity of either approach are obvious. The Mills decision invites suits 
when management controls too few shares to ensure a transaction’s 
approval; in Tandycrafts, the hydraulic pressures of a suit threatening 
to delay and perhaps scuttle a transaction can force management to 
implement trivial disclosures or even procedures as a cost-effective 
response to a nettlesome suit. 
Mills and Tandycrafts illustrate the central problem in the judicial 
production of norms: a weak inquiry into causality in the award of fees. 
Even this modest inquiry occurs without the benefit of an adversarial 
process, as the quick settlement fulfills litigants’ quest for a win-win 
situation: the defendants proceed with the deal and the plaintiff’s 
counsel is paid. Their haste to settle not only cheapens the asserted 
norm but poses the substantial risk that truly meritorious suits will be 
compromised by the weak incentives of the litigants.88 
Courts have long lamented that when faced with a settlement, they 
are poorly positioned to distinguish between an inconsequential suit’s 
expedient end and the premature demise of a valuable claim.89 Thus, 
the final paradox discussed here is the fact that poor causal inquiries 
surrounding fee awards likely work against the production of corporate 
norms. As explained earlier, norm production depends on the court 
anchoring the litigation’s outcome in a close analysis of whether the 
defendant’s conduct did or did not violate the norm that was the 
 
 88. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications 
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) (examining closely the weak incentives that surround lawyers’ 
involvement in representative suits). 
 89. See, e.g., Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting) (“Once a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders link arms 
with their former adversaries to defend the joint handiwork . . . .”); In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder 
Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 893 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Once an agreement-in-principle is struck to settle for 
supplemental disclosures, the litigation takes on an entirely different, non-adversarial 
character.”). 
COX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2016  6:54 PM 
2016] CORPORATE NORMS 527 
gravamen of the complaint. By contrast, the court’s engagement of the 
settlement is typically divorced from this norm. Instead, it focuses on 
the benefits of the settlement to the corporation or its shareholders. As 
a result, fee awards, as currently conducted, have created such cynicism 
with respect to the process that they weaken the positive contributions 
associated with the underlying norm. 
IV.  THE PATH FORWARD 
There are numerous rulings in any suit. Most judicial actions are 
ministerial in nature and provide little opportunity for the production 
of norms. Nonetheless, there are multiple moments in shareholder suits 
when norm production can occur: motions to dismiss, motions for 
interim relief such as preliminary injunctions, demand requirements in 
the context of derivative suits, and ultimately settlements. These 
procedural steps essentially act as a series of screens that separate suits 
along a spectrum extending from the meritorious to the baseless action. 
As examined below, even though judicial review of settlements has the 
potential to provide rich opportunity for norm production, current 
settlement procedures must be amended to fulfill this potential. 
The most porous filter is the criteria applied in considering the 
defense’s motion to dismiss. For example, in Delaware the complaint 
can be dismissed only when the court determines with “reasonable 
certainty” that the plaintiff could not prevail on any set of facts inferred 
from the complaint.90 Matters outside the pleadings are not considered 
in ruling on a motion to dismiss; however, if the defendant moves for 
summary judgment, rather than a motion to dismiss, documents before 
the court other than the complaint are considered.91 While it is hard to 
generalize, norms are more likely to be delineated in summary 
judgment proceedings; summary judgment requires the court to decide 
whether the undisputed facts show that the directors violated a rule of 
conduct. Nonetheless, a review of important motion-to-dismiss 
decisions reveals that motions to dismiss repeatedly involve norm 
production with respect to aspirational norms, but less so with arbiter 
 
 90. See, e.g., Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1082–83 (Del. 2001) (stating that the 
plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences that logically flow from the face of the complaint). 
The complaint must, however, set forth “well-pleaded allegations”—that is, specific allegations 
of fact and conclusions. Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 38 (Del. 1996) 
(describing this standard as being inherent notice pleading). If a motion to dismiss is granted, the 
review on appeal is de novo. Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1082. 
 91. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 68–69 (Del. 1995). 
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norms.92 For example, motions to dismiss are a weaker medium for 
resolving self-dealing matters, such as those that arise in mergers and 
acquisitions. 
As seen earlier, upon a showing of a defensive maneuver or sale-
of-control transaction, the burden of proof in Delaware shifts to 
management to demonstrate it acted reasonably. Because a motion to 
dismiss fails unless no reasonable inference of misconduct can be 
drawn from the complaint, the plaintiff can defeat the motion by 
showing fairly neutral facts, such as the use of a defensive maneuver or 
a change-of-control transaction. A leading defensive-maneuver case, 
In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation,93 recognized the 
limited space courts enjoy to grant a motion to dismiss. The issue 
addressed there was whether the board, in the face of a hostile bid, had 
upheld its fiduciary obligations when it placed approximately 16 
percent ownership in the hands of a friendly party, adopted a poison 
pill, applied the pill in a discriminatory manner to prefer one bidder 
over another, and engaged in a repurchase program.94 In denying the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court reasoned: 
As the terminology of enhanced judicial scrutiny implies, boards can 
expect to be required to justify their decisionmaking, within a range 
of reasonableness, when they adopt defensive measures with 
implications for corporate control. This scrutiny will usually not be 
satisfied by resting on a defense motion merely attacking the 
pleadings.95 
 
 92. See, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 711–12 (Del. 2009) (holding that a proxy 
which stated that a transaction was approved after “careful deliberations” by the board contained 
a material misstatement because the board’s review had in fact been very casual, and reasoning 
that the representation of careful deliberation addressed the reasonable shareholders’ concerns 
of self-interested behavior); Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1087 (explaining that the disclosure of the 
higher bid renders immaterial as a matter of law any misstatement regarding the board’s rationale 
for not accepting the higher bid); In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 68–70 (holding that Revlon was not 
triggered because the complaint had alleged that the acquisition was a stock-for-stock exchange 
and did not describe the ownership structure of the acquiring firm). Less clarity is more likely in 
motion-to-dismiss decisions. See, e.g., Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, 864 A.2d 80, 
80–85 (Del. Ch. 2004) (reasoning that one possible interpretation of the allegations that the entire 
proceeds from selling the company would go to the creditors is that no other transaction could 
have been worse for the shareholders, but it could have been developed at trial that the directors 
believed in good faith after reasonable investigation that there was no future in continuing the 
business nor any better alternative for disposing of its assets). 
 93. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995). 
 94. Id. at 71–72 (reversing the lower court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
 95. Id. at 72; see also In re Ebix, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8526-VCN, 2016 WL 208402, at 
*18 (Del. Ch. Jan. 15, 2016) (“[T]he activation of heightened scrutiny poses a systemic difficulty 
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Thus, in the heightened-scrutiny realm, norm enunciation occurs when 
the facts trigger a particular doctrine, as when the acts taken by the 
defendant are defensive maneuvers96 or the transaction’s structure 
triggers Revlon considerations.97 
The “reasonable probability of ultimate success” requirement for 
a preliminary injunction98 provides a better platform for norm 
production than rulings on motions to dismiss. For example, in 
instances of alleged disclosure violations, the reasonable-probability 
standard calls on courts to determine whether a disclosure was 
required in a specific context,99 in addition to the types of disclosures 
that companies need to make generally.100 There are considerations of 
the collateral consequences of such an order, however, that regularly 
weigh against such relief. For example, in cases where material 
misrepresentations are alleged, the general policy preference of 
ordering disclosure ex ante rather than determining damages ex post101 
is substantially qualified by the concern that an admittedly value-
 
for defendants seeking dismissal under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), given the limited record 
from which they might draw to demonstrate reasonableness.”). 
 96. See, e.g., Gantler, 965 A.2d at 705 (reversing a grant of a motion to dismiss and observing 
that the lower court overlooked financial interests of directors that supported plaintiff’s claim that 
their defensive steps were driven by a motive to entrench themselves).  
 97. See, e.g., In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 71 (holding no facts were pleaded indicating that a 
transaction posed a change of control such that Revlon would apply). 
 98. See La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1185 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(holding that to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a reasonable 
probability of ultimate success on the merits at trial, (2) that a failure to issue an injunction would 
result in immediate and irreparable injury before final hearing, and (3) that the balance of the 
hardships weighs in the plaintiff’s favor). These factors, however, are greatly impacted by the 
court’s concern for the collateral consequences of granting a preliminary injunction that stops or 
retards the transaction’s occurrence. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. However, this 
preference is substantially qualified by concern that the admittedly value-increasing transaction 
may, in the face of the resulting delay or uncertainty of approval, disappear. See McMillan v. 
Intercargo Corp., No. 16963, 1999 WL 288128, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 3, 1999) (“The threat of 
Intercargo losing its only offer if the Court issues an injunction is real, and it far outweighs the 
risks created by denying injunctive relief.”). 
 99. Hence, when a transaction is stated to have been adjudged fair by an investment bank, 
the Delaware court lists a range of collateral disclosures that must be made such as the valuation 
methods used, the key inputs into the determination, as well as the range of ultimate values. In re 
Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 203–04 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 100. See Arnold v. Soc’y for Saving Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1280 (Del. 1994) (holding 
that Delaware law does not require disclosure of unreliable or speculative information). 
 101. See In re Staples, Inc. S’holders Litig., 792 A.2d 934, 960 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“[A]n after-
the-fact damages case is not a precise or efficient method by which to remedy disclosure 
deficiencies. A post-hoc evaluation will necessarily require the court to speculate about the effect 
that certain deficiencies may have had on a stockholder vote and to award some less-than-
scientifically quantified amount of . . . damages . . . .”). 
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increasing transaction may disappear in the face of the resulting delay 
or uncertainty of approval.102 Nonetheless, the tension that surrounds 
a decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction disciplines the 
process and thus sharpens the resulting norm.103 
When the action is a derivative suit, the court’s engagement with 
the demand requirement—whether the demand is excused for futility 
or whether the response to a demand compels dismissal of the suit—
regularly involves the court probing the facts and legal principles in 
ways that produce norms. Rosenbloom v. Pyott104 illustrates how norm 
production is central to considering whether the derivative-suit 
plaintiff must make a demand on the board of directors.105 For years, 
defendant Allergan, Inc.’s board of directors pursued a number of 
initiatives designed to promote off-label sales of its main product, 
Botox.106 Such off-label sales were illegal; indeed, the board had 
received several warnings from the Food and Drug Administration 
that Allergan’s practices violated the law.107 When Allergan was 
eventually prosecuted and paid $600 million in the resulting civil and 
criminal enforcement actions, a derivative suit against its directors 
ensued.108 The issue on appeal to the Ninth Circuit was whether the 
lower court, applying Delaware law, correctly held that the plaintiff 
must make a pre-suit demand on the board of directors.109 Under the 
Delaware standard, demand is excused if facts are alleged with 
particularity that create a reasonable doubt that the directors are 
“disinterested or independent.”110 The Ninth Circuit held such a doubt 
 
 102. See McMillan, 1999 WL 288128, at *4 (“The threat of Intercargo losing its only offer if 
the Court issues an injunction is real, and it far outweighs the risks created by denying injunctive 
relief.”). 
 103. A very different problem confronts the plaintiff and the court when defendants moot 
alleged disclosure violations by making supplementary disclosures. In this instance, lacking an 
opinion, a norm was not generated by the court, but clearly there is the basis for inviting an inquiry 
into causal connection to the suit as well as the probable benefits of the resulting finding. See 
Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Del. 1989) (upholding the award of fees 
in such a case). 
 104. Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 105. Id. at 1148. 
 106. Id. at 1142–44. 
 107. Id. at 1146–47. 
 108. Id. at 1140. 
 109. Id. at 1140–41. 
 110. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
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was created by allegations showing a substantial likelihood that the 
directors were liable for failing to act when they had a duty to act.111 
Following a close review of the factual allegations, the 
Rosenbloom court announced several standards of conduct in the 
context of directors’ oversight responsibilities and fiduciary obligations 
not to engage in criminal conduct. For example, the court highlighted 
warnings from the FDA and an employee’s resignation for ethical 
reasons that triggered the directors’ obligation to inquire whether the 
company was violating the law.112 By emphasizing that directors can be 
held liable when facts indicate that they turned a blind eye to 
compliance with respect to a critical product (off-label sales of Botox 
represented 70–80 percent of all Botox sales, and Botox accounted for 
nearly 40 percent of all Allergan’s revenues during this period),113 the 
court reinforced directors’ obligations to ensure that there are robust 
and reliable information-compliance systems in place to prevent 
misconduct. The court also observed that the pervasiveness of 
Allergan’s violations in the face of numerous red flags warning of 
illegal off-label sales sustained an inference that the directors “adopted 
a plan premised on illegal off-label marketing of Botox”114: 
Plaintiffs’ particularized factual allegations . . . suffice to show that the 
Board either did nothing despite actual or constructive knowledge of 
wrongdoing at Allergan, or knowingly adopted a business plan 
premised on illegal conduct. In either case, Allergan’s directors 
violated their duty of loyalty and would face a substantial likelihood 
of liability; in the latter case, they would also have forfeited the 
protection of the business judgment rule.115 
This statement, and the effect of excusing a pre-suit demand, are 
important affirmations of what is required of directors in discharging 
their oversight responsibilities. 
In each of the above-reviewed procedural contexts—motions to 
dismiss, petitions for preliminary injunctions, and the derivative suit’s 
demand requirement—the court’s analysis is anchored in the 
substantive allegations set forth in the complaint. This allows each of 
those procedures to be a forum in which norms are created. Because 
settlements, where so many shareholder suits end, do not share this 
 
 111. Rosenbloom, 765 F.3d at 1151. 
 112. Id. at 1152–54. 
 113. Id. at 1142. 
 114. Id. at 1158. 
 115. Id. at 1159. 
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same mooring in the substance of the dispute, they are not nearly as 
useful for generating norms. 
The facts of Trulia, Inc. are useful in illustrating how norms can be 
poorly produced by the current settlement procedures. The complaint 
alleged that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by approving 
a merger with a single bidder that allegedly failed to obtain the highest 
exchange ratio for the shareholders.116 The parties reached an 
agreement in time for several supplemental disclosures to be added to 
the proxy statement circulated among shareholders; the merger was 
ultimately approved by 79.52 percent of the shares entitled to vote 
(99.15 percent of the votes cast).117 In addition to agreeing to the 
supplemental disclosures, the defendants agreed not to oppose a fee 
request of $375,000 or less.118 Chancellor Bouchard closely examined 
each of the supplementary disclosures that regarded distinct features 
of the valuation process used by the investment bank in its fairness 
opinion to the board. He found the supplementary disclosures were not 
meaningful in light of all the other information the company disclosed 
regarding the valuation process.119 He rejected the settlement, thereby 
leaving the suit as it had started: a bald accusation of breach of fiduciary 
obligation. Although the right result was reached in Trulia, Inc., the 
decision would have been more revealing if the court had analyzed 
whether the proposed settlement was consistent with the complaint’s 
allegations. 
Had the court linked the settlement to the complaint that 
established its jurisdiction, it could have further questioned how the 
proposed remedy—disclosure of facts surrounding a fiduciary’s breach 
of duty—failed to complement corporate fiduciary-duty principles.120 
To be sure, a universal feature of fiduciary obligations is the duty of 
candor. The director’s obligations, however, compel more than 
disclosure. They include an affirmative obligation to act in the interests 
of the corporation and its shareholders. The misconduct alleged in 
 
 116. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 889 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 890. 
 119. Id. at 899–907. 
 120. Further disquiet over disclosure-only settlement arises from the fact that there does not 
appear to have ever been a request for a preliminary injunction seeking disclosure before the 
shareholders voted. The record recounts how the parties reached an agreement on supplementary 
disclosures without such a motion and, for that matter, without the defense raising a motion to 
dismiss. Thus, the defense sought the plaintiff’s cooperation in settling the matter before the 
transaction was closed and proceeded to court only after the transaction had been approved (with 
the supplementary disclosures the court considered not meaningful). 
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Trulia, Inc. was not any want of disclosure, but the directors’ failure to 
take steps to secure a higher exchange ratio.121 Because nondisclosure 
was not a part of the alleged breach by the defendants, a settlement in 
which only disclosure was obtained naturally invited skepticism. 
The disclosure provided in the proposed settlement was also 
irrelevant to the alleged misconduct because of Delaware’s approach 
to the ratification of misconduct. A fiduciary’s breach can be approved 
by shareholders following full disclosure, but under the strict equitable- 
ratification approach followed in Delaware, any such shareholder 
approval must occur in a vote distinct from the vote in which 
shareholders approve the transaction, such as the merger in Trulia, 
Inc.122 In the absence of a separate vote to ratify the directors’ conduct, 
the disclosures the parties agreed to were not a step toward excusing 
the alleged breach by the directors. Thus, the court should have raised 
another basis on which to reject the settlement: the terms of the 
settlement that were nonresponsive to the need under Delaware law 
for the shareholders to meaningfully address the misconduct alleged in 
the suit. 
CONCLUSION 
Shareholder litigation is frequently representative litigation, in the 
form of class actions or derivative suits. Such a suit’s plaintiff typically 
has an insufficiently small stake in the outcome to serve as an adequate 
monitor of its counsel. This sets the stage for agency costs that can lead 
to inconsequential settlements. And, as illustrated by Trulia, Inc., such 
a settlement can be viewed as the efficient and hence desirable end of 
the suit by the defendant and its counsel. But this dynamic threatens 
the vitality of corporate norms. 
Because of both the importance of norms and the frequency with 
which corporate disputes are settled, courts should probe settlements 
to ensure that the relief provided in the settlement is worthy of the 
norm raised in the complaint. In the case of arbiter norms, the issue is 
whether there is a self-dealing relationship or type of transaction that 
otherwise rids the transaction of propriety and invites judicial review 
for fairness. In reviewing the settlement, courts can not only highlight 
that which has established that an arbiter norm was involved, but more 
 
 121. This point is emphasized by Chancellor Bouchard in his careful qualification of the scope 
of the case’s holding. He states that the review standard embraced in Trulia, Inc. is limited to 
instances in which the complaint does not raise “a plainly material misrepresentation.” Id. at 898. 
 122. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009). 
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importantly how the case’s facts align with the arbiter norm and how 
the settlement improves the fairness of the process and terms. 
When a settlement results from an alleged violation of an 
aspirational norm, as was the case in Trulia, Inc., norm overbreadth 
poses greater challenges than those present in suits involving arbiter 
norms only. As illustrated in Trulia, Inc., courts should conduct a non-
deferential assessment of the case’s record to judge whether the 
settlement provides a substantial benefit other than bringing the suit to 
an amicable conclusion. Absent such a benefit, the court should 
withhold its approval. To be sure, courts do review settlements and 
frequently do so closely. What I argue is that judicial review is more 
likely to be closer to, and certainly more consistent with, the court’s 
role of ensuring protection to the shareholders, if the judge views the 
settlement through the lens of the norm violations alleged in the 
complaint. If instead the review focuses on the worth of new 
disclosures or the governance procedures provided by the settlement, 
the review steps away from the question of what was proper or 
improper conduct and legitimates the process whereby the lawyers 
price their willingness to avoid the production of norms. 
 
 
